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INTRODUCTION
It is obvious to most that the ties between people and businesses in
different countries have increased dramatically in recent years. One
of the effects of this globalization of the world’s economies and
societies is an increase in international or transnational litigation.1
For, as traveling and conducting business across international
borders becomes easier and cheaper, and the number of
international business transactions increases, so too have the number
of lawsuits involving parties and transactions or occurrences from
different countries.2
1. See Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation: Is There a “Field”? A Tribute to
Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1427, 1427 (2006) (discussing the development
of the field of transnational litigation and the growth of its importance in recent
years).
2. See N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of
International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 601, 608 (2006) (stating
that increased global commerce has led to a “proliferation” of the cases in which
more than one country has jurisdiction); Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A
Decade of Parallel Proceedings and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational
Litigation, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 30–47 (2004) (discussing trends in
international parallel proceedings); Margarita Treviño de Coale, Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin
or Abstain?: A Survey of Foreign Parallel Litigation in the Federal Courts of the United States,
17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 79, 80 (1999) (noting that expansion of transnational economic
activities and a corresponding increase in international business disputes have
increased the number of parallel lawsuits being filed in the U.S. and abroad).
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This development has also led to a corresponding increase in the
number of lawsuits before United States courts which are similar, or
indeed sometimes exactly parallel, to lawsuits pending before foreign
courts.3 This is because oftentimes both United States federal courts
and courts of foreign countries have jurisdiction to hear cases
involving the same or similar parties and issues, and the attorneys
involved file lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions in an effort to find the
best venue for their client.4 In response, litigants sometimes seek to
have a federal court stay or dismiss a proceeding and allow the
foreign court to decide the legal issues involved.5
The increase in foreign parallel litigation has created a need for
consistency and predictability in how a federal court will determine
whether to stay or dismiss a case in favor of a concurrent, parallel
proceeding in a foreign court.6 At present, federal courts, due to a
lack of Supreme Court guidance7 and no relevant statutory authority,8
do not uniformly apply one analysis to determine the outcome of

3. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 521 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that expansive principles of
jurisdiction, along with incentives derived from differences among the legal systems
in different countries, have made it feasible and advantageous for litigants to engage
in lawsuits in more than one country).
4. See Andrés Rivero et al., Essay, A Comity of Errors: Understanding the
International Abstention Doctrine, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 405, 416 (2005) (arguing that
attorneys representing clients who have been served process in a foreign court
should not be put off from filing a similar proceeding in another court because they
“owe it to . . . [their] client[s] to try to bring the case in the most convenient and
appropriate forum”). But see James P. George, International Parallel Litigation—A
Survey of Current Conventions and Model Laws, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 499, 501 (2002)
(noting criticisms of parallel litigation, including the arguments that it is “vexing and
harassing, wasteful of the parties’ and courts’ resources,” and can produce
inconsistent results and inter-governmental discord).
5. Such a request is based on the common law lis alibi pendens doctrine, which
allows a court to stay or dismiss a proceeding in favor of an action in another court
that involves similar parties and matters. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 522
(providing an overview of federal courts and international parallel proceedings);
Treviño de Coale, supra note 2, at 89 (discussing the common law doctrine of lis alibi
pendens).
6. See Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting the
importance of “sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for
predictability in the resolution of disputes”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3355 (1985)); Teitz, supra note 2, at 2–
3 (arguing that the proliferation of international parallel proceedings and the variety
of approaches used to address them highlights the increasing need for a “uniform
response”).
7. See Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75
GEO. L.J. 99, 103–04 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to provide
federal courts with meaningful guidance on when to abstain in favor of a concurrent
proceeding, noting specifically that “[r]ather than providing the lower courts with
meaningful criteria for principled restraint, the Supreme Court has supplied an
empty conglomeration of talismanic phrases and incantations”).
8. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 523.
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such a motion.9 The lack of uniformity has made the issue of
international parallel litigation one of the most unsettled areas of law
involving federal jurisdiction in the United States.10
Federal courts have primarily followed two abstention doctrines
articulated by the Supreme Court when faced with a motion to stay or
dismiss a lawsuit in light of a concurrent, parallel proceeding in a
foreign court.11 A significant number of federal courts have based
their analyses on Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States,12 which addressed when a federal court should abstain in favor
of a parallel proceeding in a state court.13 Other courts have applied
the analysis set forth in Landis v. North American Co.,14 which
addressed when a federal court should abstain in favor of a parallel
9. See Calamita, supra note 2, at 603 (noting the lack of consensus in U.S. federal
courts as to the framework for addressing international parallel proceedings);
Martine Stückelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference,
26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 949, 960–61 (2001) (arguing that the lack of a Supreme Court
decision on international parallel proceedings has led to different interpretations of
the issue in different circuits); Louise Ellen Teitz, Parallel Proceedings: Treading
Carefully, in International Litigation (Baron Legum, ed.), 32 INT’L LAW. 223, 229 (1997)
(arguing that the proliferation of bases of international parallel proceedings have
left litigants with little certainty); see also Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F.
Supp. 2d 248, 252 (D. Mass. 1999) (noting disagreement among federal courts as to
whether they have the power both to dismiss or stay a proceeding pending the
outcome of a parallel proceeding in a foreign court).
10. Calamita, supra note 2, at 678.
11. See George, supra note 4, at 507–08 (noting that federal courts have followed
the set of factors laid out in Landis v. North American Co. or in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States when addressing a motion to stay or dismiss
pending the outcome of a parallel proceeding in a foreign court); Calamita, supra
note 2, at 613 (discussing the application of Colorado River and Landis to the question
of international parallel proceedings). These two authors have argued that there
exists a third approach, distinct from the first two and based on comity, that is
exemplified in the doctrine set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Turner Entm’t Co. v.
Degeto Film GMBH. George, supra note 4, at 508; Calamita, supra note 2, at 614.
However, the framework laid out in Turner, while different than the frameworks
based on Colorado River and Landis, is directly derived from these two doctrines. Far
from being a separate doctrine, the Turner framework is an evolution of the analyses
set forth in Colorado River and Landis and applied by the federal courts. Turner is,
therefore, an example of the different ways in which circuit courts, in the vacuum
created by the silence of the Supreme Court on the issue, have sought to address the
issue of abstention in favor of a foreign proceeding.
12. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
13. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 524; Calamita, supra note 2, at 613
(arguing Colorado River is one of three approaches federal courts have used to decide
international parallel litigation cases); George, supra note 4, at 507–08 (noting
courts have “borrowed” the analysis in Colorado River to address international parallel
proceedings); Rivero et al., supra note 4, at 406–07 (arguing the “genesis” of
international abstention cases is the “wise judicial administration” standard set forth
in Colorado River); Stückelberg, supra note 9, at 960–61 (noting that because the
Supreme Court has not addressed the use of a stay in the context of international
parallel proceedings, federal courts have applied Colorado River to help analyze the
issue).
14. 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
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proceeding in another federal court.15 Under an application of
either scenario—or sometimes a combination of both—federal
courts’ analyses in different circuits have varied, leading to additional
uncertainty about how a federal court will analyze such a case.16
This Comment argues that federal courts need a single framework
for analyzing how to determine whether they should stay or dismiss a
proceeding in favor of a concurrent, parallel proceeding in a foreign
court.17 Although the Colorado River framework has not been without
its critics with respect to abstention in favor of parallel domestic
proceedings,18 there are facets of the doctrine that, as several lower
courts have recognized, are particularly useful where the parallel
proceeding is taking place outside of the United States. Thus, this
Comment explains the utility of the Colorado River doctrine in the
context of parallel foreign or international proceedings and suggests
a few minor amendments thereto that better account for both the
difficulties lower courts have encountered in applying Colorado River
to date and the unique questions that arise where foreign or
international proceedings are concerned.
After providing a
background on the Supreme Court’s domestic abstention
15. Many of the same scholars who have discussed the application of Colorado
River have also noted the use of Landis by some federal courts seeking precedent on
which to base their decisions when presented with a case parallel to currently
pending foreign litigation. See Calamita, supra note 2, at 613 (noting the application
of Landis to international parallel proceedings); George, supra note 4, at 507–08
(arguing that Landis serves as an analytical base for U.S. federal courts in
international parallel proceedings); Stückelberg, supra note 9, at 960–61 (discussing
how some district courts use the precedent in Landis to justify their power to stay a
case in parallel proceedings).
16. See supra note 9 (noting the level of uncertainty on how a court will analyze a
motion to dismiss or stay a proceeding pending the outcome of a parallel proceeding
before a foreign court).
17. Scholarship in this area has mostly noted the application of the domestic
abstention doctrines to international parallel proceedings. See George, supra note 4,
at 507 (discussing the application of Landis and Colorado River to international
parallel proceedings); Rivero et al., supra note 4, at 406 (arguing that a court will
apply the Turner analysis, which is based on Colorado River, when addressing
international parallel proceedings). A few commentators have argued for a new
approach to the issue, including the establishment of international norms that
promote predictability and address concerns of both civil law and common law
countries and the use of comity to dictate decision-making. See, e.g., Calamita, supra
note 2, at 679 (arguing for the development of an international abstention doctrine
based on comity and providing deference to the first-filed case); George, supra note
4, at 529–30 (making recommendations for model laws and treaties addressing
international parallel litigation); Stückelberg, supra note 9, at 978–79 (arguing for an
international convention to address international parallel proceedings); Teitz, supra
note 9, at 229 (arguing in support of the establishment of the Model Conflict of
Jurisdiction Act proposed by the American Bar Association).
18. See, e.g., James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How To Neutralize the
Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1095 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme
Court in Colorado River and Cone created “an unwieldy six-factor balancing test” that is
difficult to apply and difficult for appellate courts to supervise).
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jurisprudence and its application to international parallel litigation,
this Comment outlines the different options available to a federal
court addressing a lawsuit parallel to a concurrent proceeding in a
foreign court. This Comment then discusses concerns that must be
addressed under a revised framework and suggests how federal courts
should improve their treatment of these cases to better reflect the
concerns and issues that arise in international parallel proceedings.
I. FROM PULLMAN TO QUACKENBUSH: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ABSTENTION DOCTRINES IN FEDERAL COURTS
Any discussion of how federal courts address international parallel
proceedings must begin with a presentation of the Supreme Court’s
domestic abstention doctrines,19 which are most often criticized
primarily due to a belief that abstention is unconstitutional.20 This
discussion is necessary because, due to the lack of Supreme Court
guidance on how federal courts should approach international
parallel proceedings, lower federal courts have applied Supreme
Court domestic abstention jurisprudence to this issue.21

19. There is an inconsistency among scholars when referring to judicial
abstention: some refer to one abstention doctrine, with different subparts, and
others to different abstention doctrines. This Comment will refer to separate
abstention doctrines. See David A. Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of
Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV. 651, 656 (1985) (arguing that while some refer to
“the abstention doctrine,” it is more appropriate to refer to abstention doctrines
because each refers to distinguishable lines of cases).
20. Several articles have noted the lack of constitutional support for the use of
the abstention doctrine to stay or dismiss a proceeding validly before a federal court.
They argue that separation of powers principles and the Constitution require federal
courts to hear all, or almost all, cases rightly before them. See Mullenix, supra note 7,
at 101 (arguing that the so-called “fourth branch” of the abstention doctrine,
outlined in Colorado River, “is an invidious encroachment on the constitutional and
statutory rights of federal litigants”); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers,
and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (1984) (arguing that federal
courts should abstain from exercising their authority to hear a case only in “narrowly
defined circumstances”).
Other commentators, however, have argued that federal courts do have the power
to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. See Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our
Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention Doctrine Will Always Be With Us—Get
Over It!!, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375, 424 (2003) (arguing that federal courts use
“prudence and wisdom” in their exercise of abstention); Calamita, supra note 2, at
664 (“[Abstention doctrines] are not a betrayal of the text of the Constitution . . .
[but] are a deeply entrenched aspect of the judicial function, supported both by the
historical development of the U.S. legal system and contemporary judicial
practice.”).
21. See Teitz, supra note 2, at 71 (observing that federal courts apply domestic
abstention doctrines to address international parallel proceedings).
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A. Pre-Colorado River Abstention Doctrine Cases
Prior to its decision in Colorado River, the Supreme Court
developed three abstention doctrines addressing specific
circumstances in which a federal court should abstain from deciding
a case and should provide deference to a state proceeding. Because
the three doctrines help lay a framework of Supreme Court
abstention jurisprudence and are discussed in Colorado River,22 they
are worth presenting here.
The first abstention doctrine, the Pullman Doctrine, stands for the
proposition that federal courts should avoid decisions of
Constitutional questions when the case may be disposed of by state
law.23 The doctrine is named after the case from which it was
developed, Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.24 The Court based its
holding on a finding that the issues involved in the case touched on
“social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless
no alternative to its adjudication is open.”25 This type of abstention
argues for a stay in the proceeding, rather than a full dismissal.26
22. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813–
17 (1976) (discussing three general categories of federal abstention in favor of a state
proceeding).
23. See Birdsong, supra note 20, at 377 (discussing the implications of Pullman
abstention); Steven Plitt & Joshua D. Rogers, Judicial Abstinence: Ninth Circuit
Jurisdictional Celibacy for Claims Brought Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 27
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 751, 761 (2004) (arguing that Pullman abstention is applied when
there is an unsettled question of state law, and there is conceivably a construction of
the law that will “moot, limit or change the way the federal court will view the federal
question”); Redish, supra note 20, at 95 (arguing that Pullman reflects a simple
principle of federalism, which is to avoid invalidating state laws under the
Constitution if possible).
24. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). This case involved an order by the state-run Texas
Railroad Commission that stated no sleeping car on any trains in the state could be
operated unless a conductor from the Pullman Company was in charge of it. Id. at
497–98. The company sued the state in federal court, claiming the law was
unauthorized under the relevant Texas enabling statute, and also violated the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at
498. The union for the Pullman porters intervened in the suit as well, objecting to
the order on the ground that it discriminated against African Americans in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
25. Id. at 498. The social policy involved was the protection of African Americans
from discrimination in the workplace. The opinion suggests that the Justices did not
want to have to find that the law was unconstitutional if a state court could first find
that the law was invalid because it violated the statute upon which it was based. See
Rehnquist, supra note 18, at 1070 (discussing the Court’s decision making in
Pullman).
26. See Birdsong, supra note 20, at 379 (noting that Pullman stands for the
proposition that federal courts may stay but not dismiss a proceeding in federal
court); Redish, supra note 20, at 759 (stating that the Pullman abstention does not
undermine separation of powers principles as severely as some of the other
principles because it calls for a stay and not a dismissal).
The Pullman Doctrine does not apply only to situations in which there are parallel
proceedings in a federal and state court. Indeed, at the time Pullman was heard, a

134

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:127

The second abstention doctrine arose out of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,27 and calls for a federal court to
dismiss a proceeding in favor of a state court’s parallel proceeding “to
avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of its own
affairs.”28 The case involved another claim against the Texas Railroad
Commission, this time concerning the lease of land for oil drilling.29
The Court held that the case “so clearly involves basic problems of
Texas policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the
Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them.”30
The third abstention doctrine derives from the Supreme Court
decision Younger v. Harris31 and bars federal courts from hearing
constitutional challenges to state action under circumstances in
which federal action can be “regarded as an improper intrusion on
the right of a state to enforce its laws in its own courts.”32 While
Younger abstention originally applied only to federal litigation that
involved the constitutionality of a state criminal proceeding,33 the
Supreme Court extended the doctrine to apply to situations where a
federal court is asked to issue a declaratory judgment, or in quasijudicial and civil proceedings.34

state proceeding had not yet been filed. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501–02. In its opinion,
however, the Court stated that such a proceeding should be brought before a state
court and that the federal court should only retain jurisdiction over the federal issues
pending completion of the state proceedings. Id.
27. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
28. Birdsong, supra note 20, at 379 (citations omitted); see Redish, supra note 20,
at 76 (characterizing Burford as abstention used to “prevent federal judicial
interference in complex state administrative schemes”).
29. Sun Oil sued the Commission and Burford, a competitor, claiming that an
order of the Commission granting Burford a permit to drill oil wells on its property
denied Sun Oil due process of law. Burford, 319 U.S. at 316–17. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals, which had reversed the district court’s
refusal to enjoin the order of the Commission. Id. at 334.
30. Id. at 332. Here, the Court found a state court should decide the issue
because of the highly technical nature of determining rights in relation to oil drilling
contracts. Id.
31. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The case concerned criminal prosecution under the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act, which proscribed a wide range of allegedly
subversive activities. Id. at 38. The defendant, John Harris, Jr., filed a complaint in
federal district court after he had been indicted under the California law, urging the
court to enjoin Younger, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, from
prosecuting him. Id. at 38–39. Harris claimed the prosecution violated his federal
constitutional right to free speech and press under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id.
32. Birdsong, supra note 20, at 381 (citations omitted).
33. In Younger, the Supreme Court said abstention was appropriate because of
the “fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal
prosecutions.” 401 U.S. at 46.
34. See Birdsong, supra note 20, at 383 (discussing application of the Younger
doctrine by subsequent Supreme Courts).
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B. Colorado River and Its Progeny
Colorado River
Five years after Younger, the Supreme Court decided Colorado River,
and outlined its fourth and final abstention doctrine. In this case,
the Supreme Court laid a foundation for federal courts to decline to
exercise their jurisdiction to hear a case in deference to a parallel
state proceeding, but only in “exceptional circumstances.”35 The case
involved a dispute over water rights in Colorado.36 The federal
government filed the lawsuit in federal court against approximately
one thousand water users in a certain state water district.37 One of
the defendants in that suit filed to join the U.S. government to an
ongoing proceeding in state court, while several other defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the federal proceeding.38 The district court
granted the motion, holding that the doctrine of abstention required
deference to the state court proceedings.39 The court of appeals
reversed this decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the federal court had jurisdiction to hear the
case40 and, if so, whether abstention was appropriate.41
In its opinion, the Court first reviewed its jurisprudence on
abstention, discussing the three doctrines developed in Pullman,
Burford, and Younger.42 Finding that none applied to the present
situation,43 the Court stated that “there are principles unrelated to
considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard for
federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the
1.

35. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 524–25 (discussing the purpose and
application of Colorado River).
36. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805
(1976). This case was based on a lawsuit brought by the United States on behalf of
the federal government and two Native American tribes seeking a declaratory
judgment as to the federal government’s rights to certain water bodies and their
tributaries in the Colorado Water Division. Id.
37. Id. at 806.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The defendants in their motion claimed that the district court should dismiss
the case because the court was without jurisdiction to determine federal water rights.
Id. While the district court dismissed the case on abstention principles, the court of
appeals held that the federal court did have jurisdiction to hear the case under 28
U.S.C. § 1345. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 814–17.
43. Id. at 817. Pullman did not apply because the case did not present a federal
constitutional question. Id. at 814. The Court held Burford did not apply because
while state claims were involved, the state law was “settled” and no questions of state
policy were presented for decision. Id. at 815. Lastly, the Court said Younger was
inapplicable because the Court was not being asked to grant a declaratory judgment
as to the validity of a state criminal law. Id. at 816–17.
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contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by
federal courts or by state and federal courts.”44 These principles, it
asserted, are based on considerations of “[w]ise judicial
administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources
and comprehensive disposition of litigation.”45 The Court cautioned
that federal courts should exercise abstention in such situations only
in “exceptional” circumstances, as there exists a “virtually unflagging
obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given
them.”46
The Court proceeded to outline some of the circumstances that
would make abstention appropriate.
A court first assuming
jurisdiction over property may exercise that jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts.47 The following considerations also apply:
the inconvenience of the federal forum, the interest in avoiding
piecemeal litigation, and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained
by the two forums.48 The Court noted that no factor is “necessarily
determinative,” but in considering them, courts must take into
account both their obligation to exercise jurisdiction as well as factors
which counsel against it.49 In Colorado River itself, the Supreme Court
found the factors weighed against the exercise of jurisdiction by the
federal court, specifically because the interest of avoiding piecemeal
litigation was high and the state, rather than the federal government,
had historically held control over water rights.50
Colorado River questioned
The Supreme Court revisited its decision in Colorado River soon
thereafter in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.51 and temporarily drew
into question the applicability of Colorado River by emphasizing the
2.

44. Id. at 817.
45. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). David A. Sonenshein has
argued that the policies underlying the Court’s decision in Colorado River included
not only a consideration of state/federal relations and comity—both of which
formed the underlying reasons for the previous abstention doctrines—but also of
“judicial economy” and “litigational convenience.” Sonenshein, supra note 19, at
664.
46. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817. Seeking to underscore the importance of this
limiting factor, David A. Sonenshein in his work argued that the “tenor” of Colorado
River and its progeny is that the party seeking to have a federal court abstain from
deciding a case “bears an exceedingly heavy burden.” Sonenshein, supra note 19, at
693.
47. 424 U.S. at 818.
48. Id. at 818.
49. Id. at 818–19.
50. Id. at 819.
51. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
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discretion a district court judge has to stay or dismiss based solely on
the existence of duplicative litigation in a state court.52
Calvert involved a contract dispute between American Mutual
Reinsurance Company and Calvert Fire Insurance Company.53 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the issuance
of a writ of mandamus, designed to compel the district court judge to
proceed with the federal claims regardless of the status of the state
claims, impermissibly interfered with the discretion of a district court
to control its own docket.54
In a plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that it is up to the
“‘carefully considered judgment’ of the district court” to determine
whether to dismiss a proceeding in favor of a pending proceeding in
another jurisdiction.55 In addition, the Court held that such a
decision should not be overridden by a writ of mandamus, because
“[w]here a matter is committed to the discretion of a district court, it
cannot be said that a litigant’s right to a particular result is ‘clear and
indisputable.’”56 Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the
case back to the court of appeals.57 While this case cited Colorado
River, thereby providing support for the abstention doctrine outlined

52. See Plitt & Rogers, supra note 23, at 769 (arguing that Justice Rehnquist’s
observation that the district court had full discretion to stay the proceeding does not
conform with the “exceptional circumstances” test of Colorado River); Sonenshein,
supra note 19, at 671 (noting that Rehnquist’s opinion in Calvert has been
interpreted to stand for the proposition that lower courts can stay or dismiss based
solely on the chance of duplicative litigation if the federal suit continued).
53. Calvert, 437 U.S. at 658. In 1974, American Mutual sued Calvert in state
court, seeking to obtain a declaration that an agreement between it and Calvert was
in full force and effect. Id. This lawsuit was in response to Calvert’s attempt to
rescind the agreement by which it had become a member of the insurance pool
operated by American Mutual. Id. After filing a counterclaim in the state suit
claiming the agreement was unenforceable against it because of violations of federal
and state securities laws, Calvert filed another suit in federal court, seeking damages
under both the federal and state laws. Id. In response to a motion to dismiss filed by
American Mutual, the district court judge stayed all aspects of the federal court
proceeding except for the “limited claim for monetary damages under the 1934
Securities Act.” Id. at 659–60.
54. Id. at 660–61.
55. Id. at 663 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 665–66.
57. On remand, the court of appeals discussed another factor that argues for a
stay or dismissal—the element of vexatious litigation. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Am.
Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1234–36 (7th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court,
in a footnote in the next case in which it addresses the Colorado River doctrine,
provides tacit support for consideration of this factor, saying it has “considerable
merit.” See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 17
n.20 (1983).
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in Colorado River, Calvert did not provide great clarity on the correct
application of the Colorado River doctrine.58
Colorado River reaffirmed
The Supreme Court revisited its Colorado River decision for a
second time in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.59 In this case, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Colorado
River60 and further developed the factors a federal court should
consider when determining whether to stay or dismiss a proceeding
in favor of a similar suit in a state court.61
Cone involved a contractual dispute between the appellant hospital
and Mercury, with which it had contracted to construct an addition to
the hospital building.62 Given its interpretation of the contract,
Mercury filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking an order to compel
arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4.63 The federal
district court stayed the proceedings in response to the request by the
3.

58. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 111 (“Although the case is generally construed
as reaffirming Colorado River abstention, the Court did little in Will v. Calvert to
elucidate the Colorado River standard.”).
59. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
60. See id. at 13 (“Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States . . .
provides persuasive guidance in deciding this question [of whether the district court
erred in granting a stay]”); id. at 19 (“[T]he relevant standard is Colorado River’s
exceptional-circumstances test, as elucidated by the factors discussed in that case.”).
61. For a discussion of how Cone further developed and clarified the Colorado
River doctrine, see George, supra note 4, at 508 (presenting the factors of Colorado
River, as modified by Cone); Mullenix, supra note 7, at 112–14 (arguing that the
Supreme Court felt compelled to certify the validity of the Colorado River doctrine
because of confusing opinions in Calvert); Plitt & Rogers, supra note 23, at 769
(noting that Cone “clarified” the conflicting holdings of Colorado River and Calvert);
and Sonenshein, supra note 19, at 691 (presenting the discussion of Colorado River in
Cone).
Many cases also argue that Cone has clarified the application of Colorado River. See,
e.g., Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir.
1999) (citing to Colorado River and Cone for the “long list of factors” to balance);
Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 1993) (characterizing Cone as
“instruct[ing]” on how to apply Colorado River abstention); Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins.
Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F.2d 1193, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that Cone
gave guidance on how to interpret Colorado River); Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v.
Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the Supreme Court
enumerated the considerations a federal court should consider in determining
whether to exercise jurisdiction in Colorado River and Cone); Euromarket Designs, Inc.
v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (citing to Cone for
guidance on whether to grant a stay which is parallel to a proceeding in an Irish
court).
62. Cone, 460 U.S. at 4. The contract had called for arbitration of any disputes
between the parties. Id. at 5. However, when Mercury sought to engage the hospital
in negotiations on payment for additional costs it claimed it had incurred, the
hospital filed suit in state court, seeking declaratory judgment that Mercury was
either barred from exercising its right to arbitration because of the statute of
limitations or that Mercury had lost the right to arbitration. Id. at 6–7.
63. Id. at 7.
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hospital, who had filed a declaratory judgment action in state court.
Mercury appealed the decision.64 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and ordered the
district court to enter an order to arbitrate.65
In affirming the court of appeals’ decision, the Supreme Court laid
the groundwork for analyzing cases in which a federal court is asked
to stay a proceeding pending the outcome of a substantially similar
proceeding before a foreign court.66 First, the Court held that a stay
of a proceeding pending the outcome of a similar proceeding in
another court is sufficiently final to meet the requirements for an
appealable decision.67 Second, it held that Colorado River provides the
“relevant standard” to determine whether a stay or dismissal is
appropriate, and contrary to the defendant’s reading of Calvert, the
district court’s discretion in determining whether to grant the stay or
dismissal does not make its decision unreviewable.68 Rather, the
discretion “must be exercised under the relevant standard prescribed
by this Court.”69 Third, it added two additional factors to the analysis:
(a) whether federal law will govern the outcome of the case (which
the Court said emerged from Calvert) and (b) whether the state court
proceedings will be adequate to protect the rights of the party that
brought the case to federal court.70
The Court also provided a somewhat different interpretation of
one of the Colorado River factors. It stated that when considering the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums, a
court should not look merely to the temporal sequence of the filings,
but also to which litigation has made more progress.71
The Court discussed a number of reasons why the stay in Cone was
appropriate. First, there was no danger of piecemeal litigation,
because the issue of whether arbitration is required is “easily
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 19–27.
67. Id. at 13. This question is sometimes raised by parties seeking to argue that a
high court cannot review a stay because it does not meet the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1291. See, e.g., Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 408–10 (8th Cir. 1993)
(dismissing the appeal, holding that the district court’s decision to stay a proceeding
pending a decision in a Canadian case was not a final order and, therefore, not
appealable). Cone provides that the stay is almost always reviewable by the higher
court. Cone, 460 U.S. at 13.
68. Defendant argued that Calvert required the court of appeals to provide
greater deference to the discretion of the district court to grant the stay. Cone, 460
U.S. at 19.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 24–27; see also Sonenshein, supra note 19, at 692 (discussing the factors
Cone added to the Colorado River abstention doctrine).
71. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21.
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severable” from the merits of the underlying dispute.72 Second, while
the state lawsuit was filed first, the federal suit had made more
progress at the time the stay was granted.73 Third, federal law
provided the rule of decision on its merits, and the Court found that
the state could not provide adequate protection of Mercury’s rights
because it lacked the ability to compel the hospital to arbitrate.74
The Colorado River/Cone factors
In sum, federal courts applying Colorado River after Cone are
instructed to weigh the following factors when determining whether
to stay or dismiss a proceeding in favor of a concurrent, parallel
proceeding in another court:
(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction in rem, (if applicable);
(2) the relative convenience or inconvenience of the federal court
in adjudicating the claim;
(3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation;
(4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained, (though priority
should be evaluated in terms of the relative progress of the two suits);
(5) the presence of an issue of federal law; and
(6) the adequacy or inadequacy of the parallel proceeding.75
4.

C. Other Relevant Abstention Doctrines
1.

Intra-federal parallel litigation
The Supreme Court, in Landis v. North American Co.,76 discussed
when a federal court can abstain due to the presence of a parallel
proceeding in another federal court.77 It is appropriate to discuss the
Supreme Court’s analysis in this case because some federal courts
have applied it when presented with international parallel
proceedings.78
72. Id.
73. Id. at 22.
74. Id. at 23–27.
75. See id. at 15–27 (outlining and applying the factors discussed in Colorado River,
and adding additional factors to consider); see also Mullenix, supra note 7, at 118–19
(laying out the facts from Colorado River and Cone); cf. George, supra note 4, at 507–08
(describing nine factors relevant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine, including
whether the suit is vexatious and adding “any other special factors”).
76. 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
77. See, e.g., Stückelberg, supra note 9, at 961 (discussing the applicability of
Landis).
78. See Calamita, supra note 2, at 666 (discussing the application of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Landis to cases involving international parallel proceedings);
George, supra note 4, at 507–08 (arguing that one of three doctrines used by federal
courts to determine whether to grant a stay or dismissal is based on Landis);
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Landis involved a challenge to a district court’s decision to stay a
proceeding pending a decision by the Supreme Court from an appeal
of another federal case.79 The district court stayed the proceeding in
favor of the other proceeding because it asserted that the other
proceeding would determine the constitutionality of a new law under
review in both cases.80 The Supreme Court vacated the stay order of
the district court, finding that it did not comport with the Court’s
requirement that the length of the stay be reasonable.81 The Court
did, however, state that a district court had the authority to stay a
proceeding pending the outcome of another proceeding in a
different district court.82 To determine whether a stay is appropriate,
a court must “weigh competing interests and maintain an even
balance.”83
Landis did not outline specific factors that should guide a district
court’s decision whether to grant a stay.84 Rather, it acknowledged
that a stay would likely be appropriate in the case at bar because the
other concurrent proceeding would likely settle many of the issues in
the case and “simplify” all of the issues by reducing the number of
claims that would need to be litigated in the latter proceeding.85 The
Court also focused on the length of the stay and suggested that
forcing a plaintiff to wait several years for the outcome of the
concurrent proceeding would be “immoderate” and therefore not
within the authority of the court.86 Lastly, the opinion suggested that

Stückelberg, supra note 9, at 960–61 (noting that Landis has been used by courts to
exercise “discretionary power” to stay a case when addressing parallel proceedings).
79. Landis, 299 U.S. at 253.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 258. Specifically the Court held that “[t]he stay is immoderate and
hence unlawful unless so framed in its inception that its force will be spent within
reasonable limits, so far, at least, as they are susceptible of prevision and description.”
Id. at 257.
82. Id. at 254 (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”).
83. Id. at 254–55.
84. Courts applying Landis to international parallel proceedings have applied
factors developed by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania interpreting Landis. See
Cont’l Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(applying factors outlined in I.J.A. to the question of whether to stay a proceeding in
favor of Swiss action); I.J.A., Inc. v. Marine Holdings, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 197, 198
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (discussing factors to apply when determining whether to stay a
proceeding (citing Nigro v. Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974))).
85. Landis, 299 U.S. at 256. In addition, Justice Cardozo placed the burden on
the movant to make out a clear case of “hardship or inequity in being required to go
forward,” for, as he put it, “[o]nly in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be
compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will
define the rights of both.” Id. at 255.
86. Id. at 256–57.
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the pleading party must show some hardship or inequality in being
required to go forward with both cases.87
Interestingly, the Court was not concerned with the lack of
similarity between the parties in the two cases. Instead, it held that
the issue was one of “power,” and did not require a showing that the
parties in the two cases be identical.88 It is generally accepted that the
standard for abstention involving parallel cases in two federal courts
is easier to meet than in cases present in a state and federal court.89
2.

The Supreme Court revisits its abstention doctrines
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,90 decided by the Supreme
Court in 1996, adds a wrinkle in the Court’s abstention doctrine
jurisprudence.91 Indeed, the case addressed the applicability of the
Burford abstention doctrine.92 It involved a lawsuit initially brought in
state court by the California Insurance Commissioner, Charles
Quackenbush, against Allstate for contract and tort damages due to
Allstate’s alleged breach of reinsurance agreements.93 Affirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court held that the district court did not have the authority to dismiss
and remand a federal court proceeding to state court because the
relief sought was based on a damages claim and not a claim that arose
in equity.94 It applied this holding not only to Burford abstention
doctrine cases, but to all cases in which a party is seeking to dismiss a

87. Id. at 255.
88. Id. at 254.
89. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–
18 (1976) (noting that the opportunity for dismissal when a case is in both state and
federal courts is “considerably more limited” than when parallel cases are in two
federal courts); see also George, supra note 4, at 507–08 (arguing that Colorado River
has a stronger presumption for retaining the challenged case and allowing both
actions to proceed until one reaches a judgment); Sonenshein, supra note 19, at 670
(arguing that equating the standard for state-federal abstention with federal-foreign
abstention “distort[s]” their meanings).
90. 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
91. It should be noted that nowhere in the Quackenbush opinion did the Court
address the applicability of its abstention principles to international parallel
proceedings. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11th Cir. 1999)
(finding that the Supreme Court in Quackenbush must not have meant it to apply to
international abstention cases because it only discussed cases in which federal court
action risked interfering with state proceedings or state authority); Abdullah Sayid
Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons W.L.L. v. McDonnell Douglas Foreign Sales Corp., 988 F. Supp.
1285, 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (noting Quackenbush made no mention of any type of
international abstention).
92. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 710.
93. Id. at 709.
94. Id. at 731.
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lawsuit based on one of the Supreme Court’s abstention doctrines.95
That said, the Court held that the equity/damages distinction did not
apply to a federal court’s authority to stay a proceeding pending a
resolution in another court.96
There is currently no consensus among the courts or scholars as to
whether Quackenbush, a case addressing the Burford abstention
doctrine and considering only state-federal parallel proceedings,
applies in cases of international parallel proceedings.97 If it does,
then courts will have to look to the relief requested in determining
whether abstention in the form of a dismissal is even appropriate.
Also, if Quackenbush applies to such cases, then another unresolved
issue will have to be addressed: whether a stay in such cases is
equivalent to a dismissal.98 However, these issues are beyond the
scope of this Comment, which assumes that a stay is the functional
equivalent of a dismissal in international parallel proceedings, and
that Quackenbush does not affect the analysis of international parallel
proceedings.

95. Id. at 727–28 (“[T]he power to dismiss under the Burford doctrine, as with
other abstention doctrines . . . derives from the discretion historically enjoyed by
courts of equity.”).
96. Id. at 730 (“[W]e have permitted federal courts applying abstention
principles in damages actions to enter a stay, but we have not permitted them to
dismiss the action altogether.”).
97. See, e.g., Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding Quackenbush does not apply to analysis of international parallel
proceedings); Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252 (D.
Mass. 1999) (citations omitted) (“Quackenbush does not crisply govern in the area of
international abstention because the considerations involved in deferring to state
court proceedings are different from those involved in deferring to foreign
proceedings.”); Teitz, supra note 9, at 227 (concluding that Quackenbush does not
apply to international abstention cases through a criticism of the holding in Al-Rifai
& Sons, which held that Quackenbush applied to an international abstention case).
But see Abdullah Sayid Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons W.L.L. v. McDonnell Douglas Foreign
Sales Corp., 988 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (holding an outright dismissal
of the case was “improper in light of Quackenbush”); Calamita, supra note 2, at 660
(arguing Quackenbush affects the analysis under Colorado River and calls into question
the usage of Colorado River in Cone because the latter case involved a stay and not a
dismissal).
98. As noted in Goldhammer, for most abstention cases, “as a practical matter, a
stay is tantamount to dismissal,” and, therefore, the court asserts that a discussion of
their differences “can be somewhat academic.” Goldhammer, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
The Supreme Court, at least prior to Quackenbush, appears to agree. See Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 13 (1983) (holding a grant
of a stay was appealable as a final judgment because while “[i]t is not clear why the
judge chose to stay the case rather than to dismiss it outright . . . the practical effect
of his order was entirely the same for present purposes”); see also Sonenshein, supra
note 19, at 671 (arguing there is no meaningful difference between a stay and a
dismissal in abstention case law).
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D. Approaches to International Parallel Proceedings
1.

Options available to courts
There are generally two kinds of duplicative proceedings: reactive
litigation and repetitive litigation.99 Reactive litigation refers to a
lawsuit filed by a defendant in another case that addresses the same
case or controversy as in the first lawsuit.100 Repetitive litigation refers
to two or more suits that are substantially similar and all filed by the
same party.101 While federal courts often note whether the plaintiff
filed both suits in their analysis of whether abstention is appropriate,
the occurrence is not treated as determinative in an abstention
analysis.102
Federal courts have several options available to them when
deciding a case that is substantially similar to another case pending
before a foreign court.103 Options include: (a) stay the proceeding
pending a decision in the concurrent proceeding;104 (b) dismiss the
proceeding outright;105 (c) enjoin one party from pursuing the other
case (known as an “anti-suit injunction”);106 or (d) allow both lawsuits
to proceed at once.107 This Comment addresses only stays, dismissals,

99. See Rehnquist, supra note 18, at 1064 (citing Allan D. Vestal, Reactive
Litigation, 47 IOWA L. REV. 11 (1961); Allan D. Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L.
REV. 525 (1960)) (discussing the differences between reactive and repetitive
litigation and referring to both as “duplicative litigation”); Sonenshein, supra note
19, at 657 n.31 (discussing the differences between reactive and repetitive litigation).
100. See Sonenshein, supra note 19, at 657 n.31 (discussing origins and definitions
of “reactive” litigation).
101. See id. (defining “repetitive” litigation).
102. Compare Caspian Invs., Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 883-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing the case and considering the fact that Caspian filed both
suits as a factor when evaluating the temporal sequence of the filing of both suits),
with Cont’l Time Corp. v. Swiss Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(granting dismissal of the case even though the plaintiff in the New York suit was not
a party to a lawsuit brought in Switzerland).
103. See George, supra note 4, at 501–02 (listing options available for judges
addressing parallel proceedings); James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L.
REV. 769, 777 (1999) (discussing various remedies to parallel litigation); Teitz, supra
note 2, at 8–9 (noting options available to the courts and the problems with
enforceability of such decisions).
104. See, e.g., Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D. Mass.
1999) (denying motion to dismiss, but staying proceeding in favor of proceeding in
British court).
105. See, e.g., Caspian, 770 F. Supp. at 880 (dismissing the action due to the
existence of substantially similar litigation in Ireland).
106. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belg. World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (enjoining litigation in foreign court); see also Mark M. Trafeli,
International Deference: A Developing Procedural Remedy, 22 L.A. LAW. 18, 22–23 (1999)
(discussing use of an anti-suit injunction).
107. See, e.g., Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (refusing to grant a motion to dismiss and finding it important that
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and decisions to allow parallel litigation to proceed because the
concerns surrounding so-called anti-suit injunctions and the
analytical approach used to address them are different and beyond
the scope of this Comment.108
2.

Application of the abstention doctrines in the context of international
parallel proceedings
a. Colorado River

Grammar, Inc. v. Custom Foam Systems, Ltd.109 offers an example of
the application of Colorado River to an international abstention case.
This case involved a contractual dispute between Grammar, an
American manufacturing company, and Custom Foam Systems, Ltd.
(“CFS”) a Canadian manufacturing company.110 CFS sued Grammar
in a Canadian court in June 2006, claiming that it was owed
compensation for a breach of contract.111 Grammar responded by
filing an action in a Michigan court, which was subsequently removed
to a United States federal district court.112 Soon thereafter, CFS
moved to stay or dismiss the federal case, claiming the dispute could
be settled in the first-filed case in Canada and res judicata would
apply.113
In its opinion, the district court applied the Colorado River standard,
stating that it had a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise
jurisdiction but it had the authority to abstain in a “few
‘extraordinarily narrow’ circumstances.”114 It noted that to determine
whether a stay or dismissal was appropriate, it had to balance a
number of factors, none of which were necessarily determinative.115
the plaintiff—the same party in both the U.S. and international proceedings—relied
on trademark statutes in each of the countries as the basis for its suit).
108. This is perhaps the most controversial method of addressing parallel
litigation. This is because it involves restricting a party’s ability to bring suit in a
foreign court, which has the effect of allowing a U.S. judge to control a foreign
court’s exercise of jurisdiction. See Treviño de Coale, supra note 2, at 90–91
(discussing the circuit split on the use of anti-suit injunctions).
109. 482 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
110. Id. at 855.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 856. Grammar acknowledged in its complaint that the suit arose out of
the “same transaction or occurrence” as the Canadian suit. Id. Grammar sought a
declaratory judgment that it had no obligations under the contract or, in the
alternative, a finding that CFS breached the contract. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 856–57.
115. The court lists eight factors: (1) whether the state court has assumed
jurisdiction over any res or property; (2) whether the federal forum is less convenient
to the parties; (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which
jurisdiction was obtained; (5) whether the source of law is state or federal; (6) the
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The court determined that the cases were parallel proceedings,116 and
then considered each of the remaining Colorado River factors.
The court decided a stay was appropriate because (a) there was a
risk of piecemeal litigation because both cases were deciding the
same legal issues arising from the same contract; (b) the Canadian
action was filed first; (c) no federal law was at issue; (d) there was
only a relatively small chance that the Canadian forum would be
inadequate to protect the American plaintiff’s rights; and (e) the
Canadian proceeding had progressed further.117
b. Landis v. North American Co.
The most direct application of Landis to international parallel
proceedings is I.L.J., Inc. v. Marine Holdings, Ltd.,118 in which a federal
district court vacated a stay it had previously ordered in favor of
pending litigation in Canada.119 In this case, the court reconsidered
its previous decision to issue a stay after learning that, contrary to
what it had been told, the Canadian proceeding was not near trial,
and, therefore, a judgment in that case would not be immediately
forthcoming.120
The court observed that while it had the “inherent power” to stay
the proceeding, as stated by the Supreme Court in Landis v. North
American Co., the “complete lack of relief available in the Canadian
forum, notions of judicial efficiency, disparity in the identity of the
parties, and the improbability of a prompt disposition in the foreign
forum” all supported reversing the stay order.121 The factors upon
which it relied were derived from another Pennsylvania district court
case that had interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance in Landis.122

adequacy of the state court to protect the federal plaintiff’s rights; (7) the relative
progress of the state and federal proceedings; and (8) the presence or absence of
concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 857.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 858–61. The court dismissed application of the two remaining factors it
had outlined, stating that the in rem jurisdiction factor did not apply to the case and
the question of which jurisdiction was more convenient was a “wash” because parties
and witnesses were in both locations. Id.
118. 524 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
119. Id. at 199.
120. The court held that when the foreign litigation is in its incipiency, abstention
is not usually appropriate. Id. at 199.
121. Id.
122. The court relied on Nigro v. Blumberg, 373 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
which developed various factors to apply when addressing abstention in favor of a
concurrent proceeding in another federal court. The factors include comity,
adequacy of relief available in the alternative forum, identity of the parties and issues
in the two actions, the likelihood of prompt resolution in the alternative forum, and
relative convenience to the parties, counsel, and witnesses. Id.
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c. The “international abstention” doctrine
The so-called “international abstention doctrine” is the name for
an analysis developed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit to address abstention due to the existence of a similar
proceeding in a foreign court.123 The case to first introduce the
standard was Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH.124 Viewing
the issue as one of first impression, the court fashioned its own
analysis to address the question of whether it should abstain in favor
of the foreign proceeding.125
The court outlined three “readily identifiable goals” that a court
should seek to promote when addressing international parallel
litigation: (1) international comity; (2) fairness to litigants; and (3)
efficient use of judicial resources.126 With that starting point, the
court suggested a number of factors to be considered that help to
promote one of the aforementioned goals.127 It held that concerns of
international comity and efficiency of scarce judicial resources
weighed in favor of a stay, relying heavily on the fact that the German
court had reached a decision in the contractual dispute.128
II. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ABSTENTION
IN INTERNATIONAL PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
A discussion of Supreme Court abstention cases makes clear that
the Court has never provided a single workable analysis for federal
courts to apply when addressing a motion to stay or dismiss a
proceeding because of a concurrent proceeding in a foreign court.129
This has led federal courts to apply various frameworks to address the
issue. To reduce the inconsistencies and improve predictability,
123. For a discussion of how this doctrine differs from that of other courts
addressing the same issue, see Rivero et al., supra note 4, at 405 (discussing the
application of the Eleventh Circuit’s international abstention doctrine), and
Calamita, supra note 2, at 613 (noting that a third group of courts have applied the
reasoning developed by the Eleventh Circuit).
124. 25 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994). This case involved a contractual dispute
between an American company that licensed entertainment properties to a German
company for broadcasting in Germany. Id. at 1514.
125. See id. at 1518 (noting application of the two types of analysis: one based on
Landis and the other on Colorado River in other circuits on the question of
international abstention).
126. Id.
127. These included order of filing, which forum is more convenient to the
parties, the possibility of prejudice in the foreign forum, the desirability of avoiding
piecemeal litigation, and whether the alternative forum is likely to render a prompt
decision. Id. at 1519–22.
128. Id. at 1523.
129. See supra Part I.D (presenting Supreme Court domestic abstention
jurisprudence and its application to abstention in international parallel litigation).
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federal courts should adopt one approach—anchored in the relevant
Supreme Court jurisprudence—to determine when abstention is
appropriate in parallel international proceedings. Because of the
concerns involved, and the burden it places on the litigant seeking
abstention, Colorado River is the appropriate standard.
A. Colorado River Is a Superior Standard to Landis
Federal courts seeking the appropriate precedent to apply in
international parallel proceedings have applied a range of balancing
tests and the frameworks used are derived from the Supreme Court’s
various abstention doctrine cases.130 While a significant number of
federal courts have applied the test outlined in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, their application of it has varied
from circuit to circuit.131 In addition, courts have applied Landis and
other ad hoc abstention doctrines,132 leading to confusion as to what
standard a federal court will apply to a motion to stay or dismiss a
case due to the existence of a parallel proceeding in a foreign court.
To bring consistency to international parallel proceedings, federal
courts need to develop a succinct and easily applicable framework to
determine when to grant a stay or dismissal.133 The analysis not only

130. For a discussion of the different analytical frameworks used, see Calamita,
supra note 2, at 613–14, and George, supra note 4, at 507–08.
131. See, e.g., Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896,
898 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding parties and issues must only be substantially similar for
Colorado River to apply); Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 1993)
(requiring both concurrent cases to present identical substantive issues for Colorado
River to apply); Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253 (D.
Mass. 1999) (considering the similarity of the parties and issues along with other
relevant factors, such as which case was filed first and which forum is more
convenient to parties, witnesses, and counsel).
132. Such ad hoc analyses include opinions which conflate Landis and Colorado
River. See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 526 n.31 (noting that courts have
“blur[red]” the distinction between Landis and Colorado River due to the similarity of
the factors to be considered); see also George, supra note 103, at 905–06 (noting that
some federal courts rely on both Colorado River and Landis when determining
whether to dismiss or stay a case in deference to a foreign concurrent, parallel
proceeding).
133. Any international abstention doctrine should address, or recognize in its
analysis, the underlying differences in approach to the law in civil law and common
law countries. The concern is that countries that adhere to a more rule-based
approach to the law, instead of judge-made law, might themselves be swayed to
proceed with a case that is similar to one already filed in an American court because
of the lack of clarity as to how, or even whether, the U.S. court might decide to
abstain in favor of the foreign proceeding. Adopting a more rule-based, less ad-hoc
analysis would likely increase support for its application among civil-law countries
that normally address these issues using statutes or other codified rules. See George,
supra note 4, at 499 (discussing different approaches to adjudication of international
parallel proceedings in the United States, European countries and Australia);
Stückelberg, supra note 9, at 958–59 (discussing the civil law, code-based system used
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should be built on the jurisprudence of Colorado River and its progeny
but also should specifically address the unique concerns of
concurrent international parallel proceedings.134 In addition, the
balancing test of relevant factors should be more structured, which
would provide greater clarity and predictability for the parties
involved.135
When determining which abstention doctrine would serve as a
better basis for analysis of international parallel proceedings, one
cannot look to the various factors considered in each. This is because
Colorado River and Landis consider similar factors, including which
venue is more convenient to the parties and witnesses, adequacy of
relief available in the other forum, and the degree of identity
between the parties and issues involved in each proceeding.136 Thus,
one must look to other differences between the two standards to
determine which provides a better framework for international
parallel proceedings.
Colorado River is a more appropriate standard than Landis because
it is designed to apply to situations in which substantially similar
lawsuits are before two courts in separate court systems.137 Landis, on
the other hand, addresses abstention when there are two cases before
International parallel proceedings raise
two federal courts.138
concerns more analogous to those involved in state-federal abstention
cases because concerns of respect for a different court system are at
play.139 The contexts of the two distinct standards suggest that

to determine whether to stay or dismiss in cases concerning concurrent proceedings
in the European Union under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions).
134. For example, a Massachusetts district court recognized that the primary
policy concern that underlies abstention in the federal and state context is
federalism and federal supremacy, whereas in international parallel proceedings,
policy concerns relate to comity and foreign relations. Goldhammer, 59 F. Supp. at
252; see George, supra note 4, at 508 (arguing Colorado River emphasizes federalism);
Sonenshein, supra note 19, at 664 (arguing that the policies underlying Colorado River
include “considerations of state-federal relations,” judicial economy and litigation
convenience, as well as a special form of comity that refers to respect for state
power).
135. The Cone notion that the Colorado River factors should not be a “mechanical
checklist” has reduced the consistency and predictability in the law because the
Court has allowed the international abstention doctrine to develop on an ad hoc
basis. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983).
136. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 526 (referring to the Landis factors as
“broadly similar” to those considered under Colorado River); George, supra note 4, at
507 (noting factors of Landis and Colorado River are similar).
137. See George, supra note 103, at 906 (noting that Colorado River applies to
abstention of a federal court in favor of a parallel proceeding in a state court).
138. See id. (referring to Landis as “an instance of intra-federal parallel litigation”).
139. This similarity is present even though scholars have noted that the
predominant concern present in federal/state proceedings is federalism, and in

150

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:127

Colorado River is a better foundation for an international abstention
doctrine. Indeed, many courts have recognized the similarity in
factual scenarios that give rise to state-federal and federal-foreign
parallel proceedings and have therefore applied the Colorado River
framework to their consideration of a stay in favor of a concurrent
foreign proceeding.140
Another reason that Colorado River is a more appropriate standard
than Landis to apply to the analysis of abstention in international
parallel proceedings is that it places a heavier burden on the moving
party to prove abstention is required.141 A primary concern in
abstention cases, which underlies the need for caution, is that when a
court abstains from hearing a case rightfully before it, the court is
taking away a litigant’s right to have a suit heard in a court that has
jurisdiction over the claim.142 This issue is especially significant when
a court is considering forcing parties to litigate in another country: a
situation in which concerns of the availability of legal remedies and
the costs involved are at their highest.143
Colorado River emphasized that federal courts are generally
required to exercise jurisdiction that Congress grants them144 and
jurisdiction
should
only
be
declined
in
“exceptional
circumstances.”145 The Court even made a distinction between
parallel proceedings in two different federal courts and those in
federal court and state court and stated that the standards for when
abstention is appropriate are different.146 It determined that in the
international abstention the primary issue is comity. See supra note 134 (discussing
various concerns involved in state/federal and federal/foreign parallel proceedings).
140. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 524 (noting that a “substantial body” of
lower court decisions are based on Colorado River); see, e.g., Grammar, Inc. v. Custom
Foam Sys., Ltd., 482 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 n.5 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (noting that the
court will apply Colorado River to determine whether it should stay a proceeding in
favor of a foreign proceeding in part because it is “better supported by precedent”).
141. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 524–25 (noting that Colorado River
emphasizes the general obligation of courts to exercise jurisdiction, whereas Landis
focuses on a court’s “discretion” to decline to hear a case); George, supra note 103, at
906 (noting that Colorado River has a “strong presumption” favoring jurisdiction).
142. See Birdsong, supra note 20, at 421 (discussing criticisms of abstention,
including that it denies litigants a hearing in federal court on claims based on federal
law).
143. See, e.g., Grammar, Inc. v. Custom Foam Sys., Ltd., 482 F. Supp. 2d 853, 860
(E.D. Mich. 2007) (discussing the need to ensure that a foreign court proceeding
would protect rights that are protected in U.S. courts). But see Ingersoll Milling
Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1987) (referring to view that U.S.
law should resolve all disputes as a “parochial concept” (citations omitted)).
144. The Supreme Court, in the case, referred to the “virtually unflagging
obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
145. Id. at 813.
146. Id. at 817.
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former, the “general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation,”
whereas in the latter “the pendency of an action in the state court is
no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal
court having jurisdiction.”147 This distinction can also be seen in the
language of Landis, where the Supreme Court focused on a district
court’s “discretion” to determine whether a stay is appropriate and
noted that “[a court’s] power to stay proceedings is incidental to the
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes
on its docket.”148 The holdings in both cases suggest, therefore, that
litigants have a much heavier burden to show abstention is
appropriate when a court applies Colorado River.
Colorado River, because of the underlying concerns for which it was
developed and the higher burden it places on a litigant to show
abstention is appropriate, is a more appropriate standard to apply to
determinations of abstention in international parallel proceedings.
B. Support for an Abstention Doctrine in International Parallel Proceedings
Since the Supreme Court’s first decision outlining an abstention
principle, skepticism of the legitimacy of a federal court’s ability to
refuse to exercise jurisdiction, if it rightly could, persists.149 There are
several relevant policy considerations that suggest, however, that not
only do courts have the authority to decline jurisdiction on
abstention grounds but also it is wise for them to do so.150

147. Id.
148. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
149. See, e.g., Birdsong, supra note 20, at 420 (outlining various criticisms levied on
the application of the Supreme Court’s abstention principles); Mullenix, supra note
7, at 99 (arguing against the application of the Colorado River in future cases and
calling into question the use of abstention doctrines altogether); Redish, supra note
20, at 74–75 (stating that courts should abstain only when a case fits statutorilydefined circumstances).
Scholars emphasizing federal courts’ lack of authority to decline jurisdiction often
rely on the words of Chief Justice John Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, where he stated
“we [the judiciary] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which if
given, than to usurp that which is not given.” 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
150. For an interesting rebuttal to the criticisms of the application of the various
abstention doctrines, see Birdsong, supra note 20, at 375, which argues in favor of the
application of abstention doctrines because they are used sparingly and achieve
important policy objectives.
In addition, N. Jansen Calamita has outlined several reasons why abstention in the
case of a concurrent, foreign proceeding is especially useful. Calamita, supra note 2,
at 610–11. Specifically, he cites increased litigation costs and inconveniences,
benefits to the more wealthy litigants at the expense of poorer adversaries,
monopolization of scarce judicial resources, and diplomatic risks of inconsistent
decisions. Id.
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1.

International comity
A policy consideration that supports abstention in international
parallel proceedings is international comity.151 While comity is
admittedly a somewhat vague term,152 many courts—including the
Supreme Court—agree that it is a concern that arises in the course of
how to address parallel proceedings in different court systems.153
A workable definition of comity, with respect to how it should be
addressed by federal courts, was first developed by the Supreme
Court in Hilton v. Guyot.154 In that case, the Court defined the term as
follows:
‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.155

Scholars have outlined the importance of comity as a guiding
policy consideration behind the application of abstention principles,
especially in cases where there is a parallel proceeding in a foreign
151. Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252 (D. Mass.
1999) (holding that “policies underpinning international abstention case law are
rooted in concerns about international comity”).
152. See Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 844
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting that comity summarizes “in a brief word a complex and
elusive concept”); George, supra note 103, at 783 (arguing that comity, as a legal
doctrine, is “weak, imprecise and unreliable”); Brian Pierce, The Comity Doctrine as a
Barrier to Judicial Jurisdiction: A U.S.-E.U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J. INT’L L. 525, 527
(1994) (“[C]omity has inspired a host of definitions and a wealth of academic and
judicial indignation over courts’ continued use of so nebulous and multifarious a
term.”); Rivero et al., supra note 4, at 410 (noting that comity is “not a hard and fast
rule but rather a general concept that courts use to ensure that, as the gets smaller,
we can legally coexist with the rest of the world”; Teitz, supra note 9, at 223 n.5
(noting that the notion of comity has become “an all-inclusive doctrine”).
153. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–67 (1895) (discussing the role of
comity in international law); Seguros Del Estado, S.A. v. Scientific Games, Inc., 262
F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining the doctrine of abstention in favor of a
concurrent, parallel proceeding is rooted in international comity); Turner Entm’t
Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994) (adopting
international comity as a factor because two lines of international abstention cases
have already adopted international comity as a factor to consider); Euromarket
Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 845 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (citing
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1987)) (noting
that international judicial comity is a factor to consider when determining whether
to stay or dismiss a proceeding based on the existence of a parallel proceeding in a
foreign court); Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting
“comity between nations” as one of “numerous factors” that should be considered by
a court when addressing international parallel proceedings).
154. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
155. Id. at 163–64.
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court.156 Some have even argued that comity is not only an important
consideration, but can form the basis of a “workable analytical
approach to . . . international parallel proceedings.”157 These
scholars have recognized the important role concerns of comity, or
respect for foreign nations and their internal workings, play when a
court is deciding whether to decide a case while a similar case is
being heard in a foreign court.158
While the precise definition of international comity is not always
agreed upon,159 in the context of international parallel proceedings it
has taken on a meaning of the need to respect and to recognize (to
some degree) foreign proceedings which are substantially similar to a
case before a federal court.160 It is also recognized as a guiding
principle supporting international abstention, much like notions of
federalism support abstention by federal courts in favor of state
proceedings.161 It is therefore a relevant consideration supporting
the right of federal courts to consider abstention in international
parallel proceedings.
2.

Concerns of vexatious litigation and inconsistent judgments
Two other policy concerns that support the use of abstention in
international parallel litigation are the need to reduce incentives for
156. See Calamita, supra note 2, at 678 (underscoring the importance of what he
describes as “adjudicatory comity” in international parallel proceedings).
157. Id.
158. The specific problem that this situation causes, which is beyond the scope of
this Comment, is how to enforce separate judgments in two countries that each
might have the power of res judicata over the other but have reached different
conclusions. See Stückelberg, supra note 9, at 951 (arguing that the enforcement of
judgments is an extremely critical issue in international civil litigation); Teitz, supra
note 2, at 5–6 (noting that enforcement of judgments in transnational litigation is a
difficult task and an important issue to litigants).
159. Indeed, courts and scholars do not agree as to whether the term applies to
any concurrent proceedings in two countries or whether it is only relevant when
there is a decision in the foreign proceeding. See Calamita, supra note 2, at 667 n.209
(discussing courts’ differing views on whether principles of comity only apply to
situations in which the foreign proceeding has resulted in a final judgment); George,
supra note 4, at 508 n.40 (calling into question concerns of comity in a pending
international proceeding because it does not involve “any final sovereign decree”);
Teitz, supra note 9, at 225 (comity refers to another country or sovereign’s definitive
law or judicial decision). Compare Abdullah Sayid Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons W.L.L. v.
McDonnell Douglas Foreign Sales Corp., 988 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 n.3 (E.D. Mo.
1997) (arguing that comity refers to deference of another court’s judicial decision,
not to pending actions), with Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (arguing that comity counsels that priority go to the suit first filed when the
foreign action is pending).
160. See Teitz, supra note 2, at 9 (“Comity is an implicit concern in both parallel
proceedings and enforcement of judgments.”).
161. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that
the basis for abstention in a federal proceeding in favor of a state proceeding is
different than the basis for abstention in favor of a foreign proceeding).
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vexatious litigation and the need to avoid inconsistent judgments.
The Supreme Court in Cone indicated that it would not be wrong for
a court to consider whether a party was involved in vexatious
litigation when it was determining whether to abstain from a
proceeding.162 The Court, in a footnote, stated that the Ninth Circuit
had considered the issue on remand of another abstention case, Will
v. Calvert Fire Insurance, and noted that such an issue had
“considerable merit.”163
One of the reasons why not considering abstention in international
parallel proceedings risks increases in vexatious litigation is that it
allows the richer party in a lawsuit to file multiple lawsuits as a tactic
to “exhaust” their adversaries.164 While some scholars rightly argue
that what constitutes vexation is in the eye of the beholder,165
nevertheless most can agree that creating disincentives to using such
a tactic—which is not only unfair, but also costly to the court system
and taxpayers—is a sound idea.166
The concern of inconsistent judgment in different forums is
another issue that supports the development of and need for an
international abstention doctrine. This issue is sometimes wrapped
up in the issue of international comity,167 but courts have noted the
issue of inconsistent judgment as a rationale for the decision to
abstain from a proceeding properly filed before a foreign court.168
Indeed, the issue is one of such importance that there is an effort to
develop international treaties that would address harmonization
and/or guidelines for recognition of parallel lawsuits filed in
different countries.169 Because it would likely be years before such a
162. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 17 (1983).
163. Id. at 18 n.20.
164. Calamita, supra note 2, at 610.
165. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 149 (“In litigation terms, one party’s good
lawyering is the opposing party’s vexation.”); see also Redish, supra note 20, at 97
(calling the use of multiple lawsuits by parties in a suit part of the “reality of
litigation” and something that only Congress has the power to address).
166. Interestingly, the American Law Institute has recognized the importance of
this issue by suggesting, in a draft advising courts on how to address abstention in
international parallel proceedings, that one reason a U.S. court could decide not to
defer to a first-filed foreign action is a finding that the foreign lawsuit was “vexatious
or frivolous.” Teitz, supra note 2, at 69.
167. See Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1521 (11th Cir.
1994) (noting that inconsistent or conflicting judgments raise concerns of
international comity).
168. See, e.g., Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int’l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (acknowledging that placing all parties before one tribunal in
Belgium, rather than two tribunals, would minimize the risk of inconsistent
judgments).
169. See George, supra note 4, at 499 (presenting different international-level
European and American efforts to address conflicting outcomes of similar cases in
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treaty or set of international agreements would be in place, and
would take a tremendous amount of political will, addressing the
issue through a discernable, consistent international abstention
doctrine is appropriate and necessary.
An example of a case where the risk of inconsistent judgments and
vexatious litigation was high, but these considerations were ultimately
ignored, is Abdullah Sayid Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons W.L.L. v. McDonnell
Douglas Foreign Sales Corp.170 The plaintiff in this case, which was a
trading and contracting company based in Kuwait, had entered into
several “representation agreements” with McDonnell Douglas
Corporation (“MDC”) and two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries.171
The plaintiff sued one of the subsidiaries, McDonnell Douglas
International Sales Corporation (“MDISC”) in Kuwait seeking
damages for non-renewal of the representation agreements and
payment of all commissions then due.172 After three years and a
partial judgment in its favor, the plaintiff then filed the lawsuit in U.S.
district court against the other subsidiary with which it had
contracted, McDonnell Douglas Foreign Sales Corporation
(“MDFSC”).173 It claimed it was owed money for the same unpaid
commissions.174
In its decision to deny a motion to stay or dismiss the U.S. action,
the court refused to concede that issues of international comity were
present, holding that comity is only a concern when a “definite law or
judicial decision” has been reached in a foreign court.175 In addition,
the court overlooked the time of filing, which suggested the plaintiff
only instituted the lawsuit in the U.S. court once it had learned the
Kuwaiti court was likely to only award it $640,000 of the $16 million
the plaintiff was seeking.176
The court also refused to admit that moving forward in the present
action could risk inconsistent judgments or double recovery for the
different countries and recognition of decisions in foreign courts); Stückelberg,
supra note 9, at 949 (discussing a draft convention at the Hague Conference on
Private International Law).
170. 988 F. Supp. 1285 (1997).
171. The purpose of the agreements was to promote product sales. Id. at 1287.
172. Id. at 1288.
173. Id. at 1287.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1290 n.3.
176. Abdullah Sayid Rajab Al-Rifai & Sons W.L.L. v. McDonnell Douglas Foreign
Sales Corp., 988 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (E.D. Mo. 1997). The Court of First Instance in
Kuwait reserved judgment on the plaintiff’s claims for commissions arising out of
several aircraft sales and referred the matter to the Experts Department of the
Kuwaiti Ministry of Justice, which found that the plaintiff was owed $637,588, and the
matter was referred back to the Court of First Instance for a final determination. Id.
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plaintiff177 and, instead, claimed that, while the issues involved in the
two cases were “substantially similar,” the parties were not,178 and
therefore the Kuwaiti action would not resolve any issues before it.179
The denial of a stay appeared ill-conceived, however, because the
facts suggested that the plaintiff treated the subsidiaries as one
business partner,180 and the repetitive litigation and the timing
suggest the plaintiff was taking advantage of jurisdictional rules to
circumvent a judicial outcome that did not meet its expectations.181 A
framework which stresses the considerations of vexatious litigation
and interest in avoiding inconsistent judgments, such as the one
suggested in this Comment, might have swayed the court to consider
more thoroughly the problems associated with allowing the district
court action to continue at the same time as the first-to-be-filed
Kuwaiti action.
C. Solutions: Revisions to the Colorado River Factors
The following are suggestions of minor amendments to the
Colorado River factors to be used if the standard is applied to address
international parallel proceedings. These amendments are designed
to improve the consistency with which they are applied and to
promote a stricter adherence to the analytical framework originally
provided by the Supreme Court in Colorado River and Cone.
1.

Determine as a threshold issue whether proceedings are parallel
Federal courts, in deciding whether to stay or dismiss a proceeding
in favor of a foreign proceeding, should determine as a threshold
issue whether the two proceedings are sufficiently parallel before
applying a balancing test guided by Colorado River.182 Within the
differing applications of various Supreme Court abstention doctrines,
some federal courts have treated the issue of whether the concurrent
177. The defendant in the district court case argued that the plaintiff was seeking
double recovery by filing the separate lawsuits based on identical claims for the same
set of sales. Id. at 1292.
178. Id. The court stated that while the parties need not be identical in order to
warrant a stay, the defendant provided no authority to define substantially similar
parties as two separate, wholly-owned subsidiaries, and, therefore, the court would
not “pierc[e] the corporate veil.” Id.
179. Id. at 1293.
180. The facts as summarized in the case show that the plaintiff entered into
successive representation agreements, with MDC and its two subsidiaries, that were
all for the same purpose. Id. at 1287–88.
181. Indeed, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the Kuwaiti action in response to the
defendant’s motion to dismiss or stay the U.S. action, suggesting the plaintiff wanted
to show its preference for the U.S. court to adjudicate its claim. Id. at 1289.
182. See supra Part I.B.4 (presenting Colorado River factors).
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proceedings are parallel as a threshold issue,183 and some have
addressed the similarity of parties and issues along with other
factors.184 Determining whether the two cases are substantially
similar,185 such that a decision in one would preclude the need for a
decision in the other,186 would simplify the balancing test by
eliminating for consideration any cases that were not sufficiently
similar. This would also strengthen support for application of
abstention principles by applying them only in situations where the
cases are overtly duplicative, and, therefore, concerns of international
comity, vexatious litigation, and inconsistent judgments are
highest.187
Support for this construction is implicit in the Supreme Court’s
analysis in both Colorado River and Cone, and, therefore, is rooted in
183. See Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d
88, 95 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The existence of a parallel action in an adequate foreign
jurisdiction must be the beginning, not the end, of a district court’s determination of
whether abstention is appropriate.”); Seguros Del Estado, S.A. v. Scientific Games,
Inc., 262 F.3d 1164, 1170 (11th Cir. 2001) (arguing that the threshold question is
whether the cases are parallel); Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc.,
180 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the court’s “first task” is to determine
whether the two proceedings are actually parallel); Grammar, Inc. v. Custom Foam
Sys., Ltd., 482 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (citing Romine v. CompuServe
Corp., 160 F.3d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1998)) (arguing that the threshold question is
whether the cases are parallel).
184. The other factors considered along with whether parties and issues are
substantially similar include which case is further along, possible prejudice to and
adequacy of relief for the parties in the foreign forum, and the promotion of judicial
efficiency. See Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GMBH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1523 (11th
Cir. 1994) (listing the consideration of whether the actions have the same parties
and issues in common as a factor to be addressed under the general concern of
judicial efficiency); Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253
(D. Mass. 1999) (listing the “similarity of parties and issues involved” as one of the
factors relevant to the decision); Cont’l Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F.
Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (relevant factors include the identity of the parties
and the issues of the two actions).
185. See George, supra note 4, at 500 (discussing the different views of what
constitutes parallel litigation). Compare Cont’l Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543
F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting dismissal in favor of the suit in
Switzerland, even though that case included parties and claims different from those
in the U.S. suit), with Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding
the two lawsuits not identical because the U.S. suit included officers of the defendant
corporation).
186. It should be noted, however, that there is no equivalent to the Constitution’s
Full Faith and Credit Clause such that U.S. courts are uniformly required to
recognize and enforce a decision of a foreign court. See Teitz, supra note 2, at 5–6
(arguing in support of efforts to impose enforcement requirements in U.S. courts for
judgments in foreign parallel proceedings).
187. One scholar in particular has noted the problems duplicative litigation
causes, such as waste, undermining of different legal systems, and a race to
judgment, and has, therefore, suggested that abstention is indeed most proper when
designed to avoid duplicative litigation. Rehnquist, supra note 18, at 1065, 1114; see
Birdsong, supra note 20, at 380 (noting that Colorado River doctrine is invoked to
avoid duplicative litigation).
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applicable precedent. In both cases, the Supreme Court did not list
the similarity of parties and issues as a factor to consider when
determining whether to abstain from a proceeding.188 Rather, both
cases imply that the analysis of whether to abstain cannot begin
unless a court first determines that the concurrent proceedings are
parallel and that the other proceeding will likely resolve the issues
before the federal court.189
Indeed, without “concurrent
proceedings,” the principles outlined in Colorado River appear not to
even apply.190 This understanding suggests that courts should first
determine whether the concurrent proceeding meets a definition of
parallel or substantially similar191 before embarking on an analysis of
whether a stay or dismissal would be appropriate under the
circumstances.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Finova Capital v.
Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc.192 followed this framework when
determining whether to stay a proceeding in district court pending a
decision in a case being heard in St. Lucia.193 The court affirmed a
decision by the district court to stay the proceeding pending a
188. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19–28
(1983) (presenting Colorado River factors); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976) (discussing factors to be considered).
189. In both cases, the Court uses the same language to assert a court’s power to
grant a stay or dismissal of a case, which it says is only appropriate “due to the
presence of a concurrent state proceeding.” See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818; Cone, 460
U.S. at 15.
190. Many scholars discussing Colorado River have noted that the abstention
doctrine outlined in the case is applicable only when a federal court is determining
whether to decline to hear a case because of the existence of a parallel proceeding in
another court system. See Birdsong, supra note 20, at 380 (noting that Colorado River
is invoked to avoid duplicative litigation, either in two different federal courts or in
parallel proceedings in state and federal courts); Sonenshein, supra note 19, at 658
(noting that Colorado River instructs that a federal court can dismiss or stay on action
when the subject of the suit is simultaneously the subject of litigation in a state
court); Treviño de Coale, supra note 2, at 83 (abstention proper under Colorado River
in some cases where both federal and state court have concurrent jurisdiction and
parallel litigation is proceeding in both courts); see also Grammar, Inc. v. Custom
Foam Sys., Ltd., 482 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (noting that if
concurrent proceedings are not parallel, then the Colorado River abstention is not
appropriate).
191. Courts often determine whether the cases are parallel by asking whether they
are substantially similar. See Grammar, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (“Exact parallelism is
not required; it is enough if the two proceedings are substantially similar.” (citing
Romine v. CompuServe, 160 F.3d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1998))); see also Finova Capital
Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Suits are
parallel if substantially the same parties are litigating substantially the same issues
simultaneously in two fora.”). But see Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 409 (8th Cir.
1993) (“[A]bstention . . . is appropriate where the federal court faces the identical
substantive issue presented in the state court.”) (emphasis added).
192. 180 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 1999).
193. The court said the “first task is to determine whether the federal and foreign
proceedings are in fact parallel.” Id. at 898.
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decision of the St. Lucia proceeding, which had been filed first.194
The circuit court found the cases were parallel because both asked
the court to determine ownership of two helicopters that Ryan
Helicopters had leased from Rotorcraft, but in which Finova had a
security interest.195 Satisfied that the cases were parallel, the court
ultimately found that it should stay the proceeding because the St.
Lucia action was first to assume jurisdiction, the helicopters were in
St. Lucia, and there was no countervailing federal interest because it
was a run of the mill contractual dispute.196
In sum, the Finova court was confident that the foreign court would
solve the underlying legal dispute before it and would do so fairly,
and faster than it could.197 Given the doctrine of res judicata,
therefore, the court found it best to stay the matter until such time as
the foreign suit was complete.
The problems associated with determining the similarity of issues
and parties as part of the overall balancing associated with whether a
court should abstain from hearing a case are exemplified in
Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank.198 The U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted a stay of the case filed
by Continental Time in favor of the pending litigation in
Switzerland.199 It held that while the two cases did not involve the
same parties, the Swiss suit “had the potential of including all parties
necessary for the resolution of the claims,” and that factor, plus
convenience and the imposition on Swiss Credit to defend itself in
two different cases, weighed in favor of a stay.200
If the court had been forced to determine as a threshold issue that
the cases were substantially similar, the outcome likely would have
been different. Instead of being able to weigh similarities between

194. Id. at 897.
195. Id. The court held that the only difference between two proceedings was that
Rotorcraft was not a party in the federal action, and this was “immaterial” because
Finova had at the time assumed Rotorcraft’s rights under the lease. Id.
196. Id. at 899–90.
197. See id. at 899 (noting that the St. Lucia case would more than likely eliminate
the need for any further proceedings).
198. 543 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Continental Time Corp. sued Swiss Credit
Bank in New York, seeking to recover damages for Swiss Credit’s alleged failure to
honor its obligations under a letter of credit. Id. at 409. Prior to the New York suit,
S. Frederick & Company and Arlington Distributing Company Co., Inc., had sued
Swiss Bank in Switzerland based on the same letter of credit, which had been
assigned to them by Continental. Id. By the time Continental had instigated its suit,
however, it had reacquired seventy-five percent of the letter of credit. Id.
199. See id. at 410.
200. See id.
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the cases along with other factors,201 the court would have been
required to first determine with precision if the decision in the Swiss
court would solve most of the legal issues present before it. While the
two cases involved the same letter of credit, it is not clear whether the
factual bases of the two cases were the same.202 In addition, while it is
possible (as discussed by the court) that Continental could have
joined the Swiss suit, it had not. This suggests—along with the fact
that another party was also not a party to the New York suit—that the
factual issues that would have affected the legal issues might have
varied. Forcing a court to first determine whether the two suits were
parallel would have simplified the subsequent weighing of factors and
brought to the forefront the most crucial issue: would a decision in
the foreign suit render unnecessary, through the principle of res
judicata, a decision in the New York lawsuit?
Supreme Court abstention jurisprudence and policy considerations
underlying the use of abstention doctrine due to the existence of
allegedly parallel litigation support treating the question of the
similarity of the two cases as a threshold issue. This treatment would
help to improve the consistency of the application of abstention
doctrine to international parallel proceedings—a goal that could
help to quell some of the criticisms of the Colorado River abstention
doctrine.203
2.

Apply the federal law factor to determine if proceedings are parallel
The Supreme Court’s state-federal abstention doctrine, first
outlined in Colorado River, urges a court to consider whether federal
law controls the outcome of the case, and if so, suggests that this
factor counsels against abstention.204 This factor should be folded
into the initial determination of whether the two lawsuits address the
201. The other factors the court considered were the promotion of judicial
efficiency, the likelihood of prompt resolution in the alternative forum, the
convenience of parties, counsel, and witnesses, the temporal sequence of filing of
each action, and whether Continental and Frederick had engaged in forum
shopping. Id.
202. The opinion only states that after Continental assigned the interest to
Frederick and Arlington, Swiss did not pay the letter of credit. Id. at 409.
203. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 118–29 (discussing criticisms of Colorado River
and its multi-factor balancing test, such as that the factors to be considered are vague
and unworkable).
204. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23
(1983). The Court reasoned that if federal law provides the rule of decision on the
merits of the case, then this factor would be a “major consideration weighing against
surrender.” Id. at 25. The Court argued that while this was not a factor in Colorado
River—because, it argued, it was of “ambiguous relevance”—the four-vote dissenting
opinion and Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion both discussed the fact that the
case involved issues of federal law. Id. at 23.
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same issues and parties and, therefore, whether abstention is
appropriate.205 This change would simplify the analysis and refocus
the question of whether federal law controls to answer the more
compelling question: whether a decision in one court would have
the effect of res judicata on the other court.
Generally speaking, in the framework of concurrent litigation in
federal and state courts, this factor makes sense to the degree that
one believes a federal court is more equipped to make a decision
based on federal law, even if both court systems have jurisdiction to
hear the claim.206 In concurrent federal and foreign proceedings,
however, the factor is important because if found present, it
highlights a significant difference between the two cases that would
suggest the foreign proceeding is not sufficiently parallel.207
Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd.,208 is an example of a
case that could have been decided more effectively through an
application of the question whether federal law controls to a
threshold determination of whether the concurrent proceedings
were substantially similar.209 After a thorough application of the
Colorado River and Cone factors, the court denied a motion to stay the
proceeding.210 While the court acknowledged that no single factor is
“necessarily determinative,”211 the court appeared to base its decision
205. See supra Part II.D.1 (outlining the argument for treating the question of
whether the two cases are parallel as a threshold issue).
206. This premise is undercut by what James Rehnquist calls the Constitution’s
“neutrality” on whether issues are litigated in state or federal court. Rehnquist, supra
note 18, at 1052. According to Rehnquist, if both court systems have jurisdiction,
then it is assumed under the Constitution that both can rightly decide the case and
that neither court has an interest in which decides the case, as long as jurisdictional
requirements are met. Id.
In addition, it should be noted that denying a litigant’s ability to have his case
heard in federal court, even though the court has jurisdiction, is counter-intuitive
and inconsistent with general understandings of how a court determines whether it
has the authority to hear a case in the first place. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 126
(“The exceptional circumstances standard thus has the choice of law tail wagging the
jurisdictional dog.”).
207. If the foreign proceeding is found not to be sufficiently parallel, then the
case for abstention is severely weakened. See supra note 191 (presenting courts’ views
on what constitutes parallel litigation).
208. 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
209. The case involved a trademark dispute between a large American furniture
and housewares retailer, Euromarket Designs, Inc. (commonly known as Crate &
Barrel), and a small Irish corporation that also used the name Crate & Barrel who
sold goods similar to the U.S. retailer both in a store in Dublin and through the
Internet. Id. at 827–30.
210. Factors considered included the inconvenience of the federal forum,
avoidance of piecemeal litigation, which lawsuit was first-filed, whether federal law
formed the basis of the claim, the potential probable inadequacy of the foreign
forum in protecting the litigant’s rights, the United States’ interest in adjudicating
the dispute, and international comity. See id. at 842–45.
211. Id. at 842.
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largely on the fact that the U.S. case was based on U.S. trademark law,
whereas the British and Irish cases were based on each country’s own
trademark laws.212 This finding colored the court’s determination of
most of the other factors.213
This analysis suggests that the court could have reached the same
decision using a simpler and more straightforward analysis: because
the cases in different countries relied on the trademark laws of their
respective countries, while the facts were the same, the elements of
the law were different and therefore a decision in a foreign court
would not have the effect of res judicata on the other proceedings.
Therefore, a determination that the concurrent proceedings were
not sufficiently parallel and that the abstention doctrine did not
apply would have reached the same conclusion and provided a
simpler framework for other courts to apply as precedent.214
3.

Remove the adequacy of relief factor
In Cone, the Supreme Court instructs courts determining whether
to stay or dismiss a proceeding in favor of a concurrent proceeding in
a state court to consider the adequacy of the state proceeding in
protecting the rights of the parties.215 In applying this abstention
doctrine to the question of concurrent proceeding in a foreign court,
several courts have also considered this factor.216 However, inclusion
of this factor is troubling because it is a subjective consideration that
212. As the court stated, “[W]hile Plaintiffs are free to litigate in other countries
to protect legal rights conferred upon them by the governments of other countries,
they also have a right to litigate in the United States to protect the legal rights
conferred upon them by the Lanham Act and Illinois statute.” Id. at 843.
213. See id. at 843 (proceeding with each case will not cause piecemeal litigation
because each case is based on separate claims); id. at 843–44 (noting that
adjudication of the U.S.-filed case will be inadequate in a foreign forum because the
case is based on U.S. law).
214. An example of where a court might find the two cases were parallel because
no federal law controlled the outcome is Grammar, Inc. v. Custom Foam Sys., Ltd., 482
F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2007). The court held that the stay was appropriate for
several reasons, especially that the dispute could be as easily solved in Canada as it
could in the United States because there was no federal law at issue and it was a
contractual dispute concerning the same parties. Id. at 859. Again, a determination
that the two cases were sufficiently parallel would not have precluded a balancing of
the other factors, but would have made such balancing appropriate.
215. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983).
But see Mullenix, supra note 7, at 127 (arguing that Cone provides little guidance on
the definition and relative weight of the adequacy of relief factor).
216. See, e.g., Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 1993) (deeming
adequacy of relief available in alternative forum a factor to consider); Euromarket
Designs Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same);
Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253 (D. Mass. 1999)
(same); Caspian Invs., Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (same); Cont’l Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
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allows a judge to substitute his judgment for that of the plaintiff.217
To improve the consistency and predictability of the application of
the Colorado River abstention doctrine in international parallel
proceedings, this factor should be removed.218
In applying this factor, courts have applied varying interpretations
of its meaning. For example, courts have conflated the issue of
whether the two cases were sufficiently parallel (e.g., whether they
involved substantially similar legal issues and parties) with whether
the foreign proceeding would be “adequate.” The court in I.J.A., Inc.
v. Marine Holdings, Ltd.219 followed this interpretation when it
determined that the factor compelled it to consider whether the
foreign court could resolve each of the substantive legal issues before
the U.S. court.220
Other courts have looked to whether each court would apply the
same substantive law to determine if the foreign proceeding could
provide adequate relief. In Euromarket Designs v. Crate & Barrel Ltd.,221
an Illinois district court interpreted the adequacy of relief of the
foreign forum to be based on the substantive law that applied in each
case.222 It found the foreign forums inadequate because the legal
question before the court was based on U.S. trademark law, whereas
the concurrent proceedings involving the same parties and the same
operative facts were based on the other countries’ trademark laws.223
Each case, however, was based on the same general cause of action—
trademark infringement—and while the statutory basis for the lawsuit
in each country was different, the fact that each country offered relief

217. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 141–42 (criticizing the adequacy of relief factor
as vague, unworkable, and unjustified).
218. This factor has been removed from the analysis developed by the Eleventh
Circuit in Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512 (1994). Rather, the
Eleventh Circuit suggests consideration of the possibility of prejudice to the parties
resulting from abstention by the federal court. This factor is somewhat analogous to
the adequacy of relief and is derived from cases applying the Supreme Court’s
abstention decision in Landis. Id. at 1522.
219. 524 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1981). This opinion was a reconsideration of a
previous order to stay the proceedings pending a decision in a Canadian court of a
case involving the same parties and same general dispute. Id. at 198.
220. See id. at 199 (arguing the Canadian court could not complete relief due to
different requests for relief in each lawsuit).
221. 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2000). The case involved a trademark dispute
between a large U.S. company that engaged in the sale of housewares and furniture
and an Irish retailer of similar goods. Id.
222. See id. at 843–44. Each case was based on codified trademark law in the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. Id. at 828–30.
223. Id.
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for such a cause of action could easily have suggested that the foreign
forums were adequate.224
Another method of interpretation of this factor is an assertion that
if a court simply stayed rather than dismissed a case, the factor would
become unimportant. For example, in Goldhammer v. Dunkin’ Donuts,
Inc.,225 the court noted the adequacy of relief as a factor to consider,
but sidestepped the issue by arguing that a stay of the U.S. action,
rather than a dismissal, obviated the concern for whether the foreign
forum is adequate.226 It supported its conclusion by arguing that a
stay allowed the parties to open the case in the U.S. and litigate any
remaining claims. 227
Lastly, some courts have looked to whether the foreign court is
likely to follow procedures similar to those used by the federal courts
in determining whether it could provide adequate relief. For
example, in Grammar, Inc. v. Custom Foam Systems, Ltd.,228 the district
court considered specific procedural processes of the foreign court to
determine if it was likely to provide adequate relief.229 Although
Grammar—the party challenging the motion to stay the U.S.
proceeding—informed the court that it would not receive a jury trial
in Canada and therefore argued the foreign proceeding was not
adequate, the court held that the adequacy factor counseled in favor
of declining jurisdiction.230 It based its decision on a belief that, in
general, Canadian courts “comport with American notions of due
process and are therefore capable of protecting the rights of United
States litigants.”231
These cases provide examples of how the lack of an agreed-upon
definition of what makes a foreign court “adequate” has led federal
judges to apply the factor in various ways. This inconsistency has,
therefore, allowed the courts, in effect, to supplant their subjective
determination of adequacy of a foreign forum in place of the
litigants’ determination.
224. Another consideration supporting the argument that the British and Irish
courts offered adequate relief is that the plaintiff in the U.S. case filed each lawsuit,
suggesting that the plaintiff believed that the foreign courts could offer it “adequate”
relief for damages associated with the alleged trademark infringement. Euromarket
Designs, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
225. 59 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D. Mass. 1999).
226. Id. at 254.
227. Id.
228. 482 F. Supp. 2d 853 (E.D. Mich. 2007). This case involves a contractual
dispute between an American company and a Canadian company, both in the
business of the manufacturing of automobile parts. Id. at 854.
229. Id. at 860.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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4.

Create a presumption in favor of foreign court if it has issued a decision
The last suggestion for revision of the application of the Colorado
River factors for international parallel proceedings is to create a
presumption in favor of a stay or dismissal when there has been a
judgment in the foreign proceeding.232 Concerns of piecemeal
litigation and conflicting judgments are paramount in such
situations,233 and international comity234 weighs in favor of
recognition of the decision of the foreign court if the proceedings
are indeed parallel.
The Seventh Circuit recognized the importance of this concern
when it decided Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger.235 In this case,
Granger originally sought to have the Illinois suit dismissed under a
theory of forum non conveniens, but after that motion was denied,
he filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the action was barred by res
judicata, because, by that time, the Belgian court had issued a
judgment.236 The district court, among other rulings, issued a stay

232. Some scholars have gone even further to argue that there should be a
presumption in favor of the first-filed case. See Calamita, supra note 2, at 675–76
(arguing for presumption in favor of the first-filed case in international parallel
proceedings, based on a theory of comity); see also Rehnquist, supra note 18, at 1068
(arguing for a first-filed rule for the traditional, state-federal abstention doctrine).
This position has its merits—particularly that it would discourage forum shopping
and reduce concerns of duplicative, wasteful litigation, and the potential for
inconsistent judgments. To introduce such a presumption, however, would be
inconsistent with Colorado River where the Court cautioned that a federal court
should decline jurisdiction only in “exceptional circumstances.” Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Therefore, to stay
within the analytical boundaries of Colorado River—the most applicable Supreme
Court case concerning abstention—a presumption in favor of the first-filed case
would be inappropriate.
233. See Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1987)
(discussing the concerns related to hearing a case when a decision has already been
issued in a parallel proceeding).
234. International comity, while sometimes criticized as ill-defined, is at its base a
term used to recognize the importance of respecting a judicial decision from another
country or governmental structure. See Calamita, supra note 2, at 616–31 (discussing
theoretical development of the term “comity”); Teitz, supra note 9, at 225 (arguing
that comity refers to another country’s or sovereign’s definitive law or judicial
decision). Therefore, considerations of comity are high when a foreign court has
issued some type of decision in a concurrent, parallel proceeding.
235. 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987). This case involved an employment dispute
between Ingersoll, an Illinois corporation and John P. Granger, a former Ingersoll
employee who had worked for the company in Rockford, Illinois and Brussels,
Belgium. Id. at 682. Granger brought suit against Ingersoll in a Belgian court in
1978, and Ingersoll responded in part by filing a lawsuit against Granger several
months later in an Illinois court, seeking a declaratory judgment in its favor, a return
of funds and that the Illinois court enjoin Granger from proceeding in the Belgian
suit. Id.
236. Id. at 682–83.
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pending Mr. Granger’s appeal of the Belgian suit and Ingersoll
appealed.237
In affirming the decision of the district court, the Seventh Circuit
found that “it was manifestly clear that the district court did not abuse
its discretion on staying proceedings . . . .”238 The considerations of
“judicial economy, especially the need to avoid piecemeal litigation,
strongly favored staying the district court proceedings.”239 Given that
the two proceedings were parallel, the court found it was more than
likely that the Belgian court’s judgment would resolve the issues in
the federal case and therefore there was no need for concurrent
proceedings.240
While Ingersoll did not use a presumption in favor of abstention due
to the existence of a decision in the foreign court, the factor did
weigh heavily in the grant of the motion to stay. In a revised
framework, creating a presumption in favor of a motion to stay in
such situations would likely provide necessary incentives against filing
duplicative lawsuits, which helps improve judicial efficiency, and in
the case of international parallel proceedings, will help a court meet
the demands of international comity.
CONCLUSION
To increase consistency and predictability in how federal courts will
analyze a motion to stay or dismiss a proceeding in favor of a
concurrent, parallel proceeding in a foreign court, courts should
follow an analysis based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Colorado
River. Consistent with this opinion, courts should only decline the
exercise of jurisdiction in “exceptional circumstances” and not use
the wider latitude for discretion to abstain permissible under Landis.
To address the specific concerns raised in international parallel
proceedings, the multi-factor balancing test first set out in Colorado
River should be amended to better account for both the difficulties
lower courts have encountered in applying Colorado River to date and
the unique questions that arise where foreign or international
proceedings are concerned. Specifically, courts should:
(1) determine as a threshold issue whether the two
proceedings are sufficiently parallel before embarking on a
balancing test of the other factors;

237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 683.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id.
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(2) fold the question of whether federal law will control the
resolution of the claims in the case into an initial
determination if the two suits are indeed parallel;
(3) no longer consider the adequacy of relief factor because
of its vagueness and likely inconsistent application; and
(4) create a presumption in favor of a stay or dismissal if the
case before the foreign court has proceeded to a judgment.
Beyond these suggestions, courts should look to balance the
remaining factors developed in Colorado River and its progeny241 to
determine whether to decline the exercise of jurisdiction either
temporarily (with a stay) or indefinitely (in a dismissal). This
framework will help federal courts to appropriately and consistently
address international parallel litigation involving U.S. and foreign
courts.

241. These include (1) which court first assumed jurisdiction in res; (2) the
relative convenience or inconvenience of the federal forum in adjudicating the
dispute; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; and (4) the order in
which the jurisdiction was obtained, evaluated through a determination of which
lawsuit had made more progress told resolution. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp, 460 U.S. 1, 15–27 (1983).

